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The Capital Markets Perspective on a 
National Securities Regulator 
Poonam Puri* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last four decades, successive federal governments (and at 
least one provincial government) have constituted panels, commissioned 
studies, and drafted legislation intended to lead to the creation of a na-
tional securities regulator for Canada. These attempts can be traced back 
at least as far as the 1979 Proposals for a Securities Market Law for 
Canada,1 to more recent attempts including the 2003 Wise Persons’ 
Committee2 (“WPC”), and the most recent 2009 Expert Panel on Securi-
ties Regulation (“Hockin Panel”).3 
Following the release of the Hockin Panel Report, the federal gov-
ernment created the Canadian Securities Transition Office (“CSTO”) in 
July 2009 to effectively transition to a Canadian securities regulator.4 The 
CSTO was given the mandate to (i) develop a draft Securities Act for the 
approval of the Minister of Finance; (ii) create a Transition Plan which 
would act as a roadmap for establishing a Canadian securities regulator 
and integrating the regulators of the participating jurisdictions into a new 
agency with a common organizational structure; and (iii) consult with the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Co-Director,
Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York University. An earlier version of this paper was pre-
sented at 2009 Constitutional Cases: The Thirteenth Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions 
of the Supreme Court of Canada (April 16, 2010). Stephanie Kam, Sheetal Nanda, Sylvia 
Schumacher and Matt Segal provided excellent research assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1
 Philip Anisman et al., Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, vol. 3 (Ottawa: 
Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979).  
2 Wise Persons’ Committee, It’s Time (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2003), 
online: Wise Persons’ Committee <http://www.wise-averties.ca/reports/WPC Final.pdf> [hereinafter 
“WPC”]. 
3 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capital Markets: 
Final Report and Recommendations (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2009) [hereinafter 
“Hockin Panel Report”], online: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation <http://www.expertpanel.ca/ 
eng/documents/Expert_Panel_Final_Report_And_Recommendations.pdf>.  
4 For more details on the creation of the CSTO, see online: Canadian Securities Transition 
Office <http://www.csto.ca/en/about-csto.aspx>. 
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Advisory Committee of Participating Provinces and Territories as well as 
other capital markets stakeholders on the draft Securities Act and the 
Transition Plan. 
On May 26, 2010, the federal Department of Finance released the pro-
posed Canadian Securities Act.5 On the same day, the proposed legislation 
was referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a determination of the 
Parliament of Canada’s legislative authority to enact such legislation. Que-
bec and Alberta had previously launched constitutional challenges in their 
respective provincial courts, based on the draft legislation that accompa-
nied the Hockin Panel Report. 
In July 2010, the CSTO released the Transition Plan, which ad-
dresses governance, organizational and administrative matters in relation 
to the proposed securities regulator.6 The Transition Plan will have to be 
approved by all of the participating provinces and territories and the 
CSTO is currently negotiating with the willing jurisdictions. The Cana-
dian government has allocated $150 million to address financial issues as 
a part of the negotiation that will move Canada from provincial/territorial 
regulation to a single national regulator. The Transition Plan indicates 
that the Canadian securities regulator should be up and running by late 
2012 or early 2013.7 
It is expected that the Supreme Court of Canada will hear the case in 
late 2010 or early 2011. The Transition Plan assumes that the Supreme 
Court will rule in favour of the Parliament of Canada having the constitu-
tional authority to enact the proposed Canadian Securities Act. The 
specific constitutional issue is whether a federally enacted securities act 
encroaches on provincial authority to regulate the securities market under 
“property and civil rights”, or whether the Parliament of Canada has the 
authority to regulate capital markets under its federal “trade and com-
merce” power. The heavyweights of Canadian constitutional law have 
opined that there is a valid federal power under the Constitution to regu-
late the Canadian securities market.8 
5
 Proposed Canadian Securities Act, online: Department of Finance Canada <http://www. 
fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-lvm-eng.htm>.  
6 Canadian Securities Transition Office, Transition Plan for the Canadian Securities Regu-
latory Authority, (2010), online: Canadian Securities Transition Office <http://www.csto.ca/ 
documents/Transition_Plan_for_the_CSRA .pdf>.  
7 Id., at 7. 
8
 See, e.g., the three Constitutional Opinions provided to the WPC in relation to the model pro-
posed by the WPC, online: Wise Persons’ Committee <http://www.wise-averties.ca/report_en.html>. 
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In his paper entitled “‘Please, Draw Me a Field of Jurisdiction’: 
Regulating Securities, Securing Federalism”,9 Professor Jean Leclair 
concludes that the Supreme Court of Canada will likely rule in favour of 
Parliament having the constitutional authority to regulate the securities 
market in Canada. He very reasonably argues that if the Supreme Court 
is to grant this power to Parliament, then its decision and reasoning 
should be based on empirical facts.10  
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical foundation from 
a capital markets perspective to ground the discussion and analysis on 
the constitutionality of a national securities regulator. Based on the data, 
the case for a national securities regulator for Canada is more evident 
now than it has ever been.  
This paper first explores the academic and empirical literature on the 
relationship between regulation and the strength of that jurisdiction’s 
capital markets, as measured by the cost of capital, liquidity and investor 
protection. Studies have found that Canadian companies have a higher 
cost of capital than their U.S. counterparts, even after accounting for 
risk,11 meaning that Canadian companies pay more financing than their 
peers. Canadian companies also receive lower valuations. This, in part, 
can be attributed to the limitations associated with our fragmented regu-
latory structure, as well as concerns about weak enforcement. 
The paper then explores the data on Canadian retail and institutional 
investors and their investing patterns, as well as the financing needs and 
preferences of Canadian businesses. The data show that the capital mar-
kets are now more important than ever to Canadian investors and 
businesses alike. Capital markets have become a preferred vehicle for 
investing the savings of individual Canadians, as compared to other in-
vestment opportunities. Similarly, institutional investors such as pension 
funds invest a significant proportion of their assets in the public capital 
9 Jean Leclair, “‘Please, Draw Me a Field of Jurisdiction’: Regulating Securities, Securing 
Federalism”, in this volume. 
10 Id. 
11 Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, “International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do 
Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?” (2006) 44:3 Journal of Accounting Research 485 
[hereinafter “Hail & Leuz”], where the authors observed that the cost of equity capital is 25 basis points 
higher in Canada than in the United States. See also Michael King & Dan Segal, “Valuation of Cana-
dian- vs. U.S.-Listed Equity: Is there a Discount?” (2003) Bank of Canada Working Paper 2003-6 
[hereinafter “King & Segal”], which came to the conclusion that Canadian public companies are valued 
significantly lower than those in the United States while attempting to control for a number of variables; 
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Canada Steps Up: Final Report (Toronto: 
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 2006), at 24 [hereinafter “Allen Report”], 
online: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada <http://www.tfmsl.ca>. 
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markets. In terms of financing growth and expansion for Canadian busi-
nesses, capital markets play a more dominant role than they have ever 
done in the recent past.  
Finally, the paper explores how changes in the regulatory and global 
capital markets environment further exacerbate the negative impact of 
Canada’s fragmented regulatory system and highlight the need for na-
tional regulation.  
This paper proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the academic and 
empirical literature on the relationship between regulation and regulatory 
structure and the strength of capital markets. Part III examines the data 
on the changing needs and preferences of Canadian investors and busi-
nesses. Part IV highlights the changes in the regulatory environment and 
global capital markets that would have an impact on the discussion of the 
necessity of federal versus provincial/territorial regulation of capital 
markets. Part V concludes.  
II. THE ROLE OF REGULATION OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS
This part of the paper first explores the policy rationales underlying 
capital markets regulation and explains how high investor confidence in 
a jurisdiction’s capital market helps to increase liquidity in that market 
and decrease the cost of capital that businesses in that jurisdiction must 
pay. This part then reviews the academic literature on the relationship 
between strong regulation and the development of capital markets. It 
finds that academic studies show that Canadian companies suffer from a 
“Canadian discount” in that they pay more for capital than their U.S. 
counterparts. Canadian companies also suffer from lower valuations. 
This can be attributed, in part, to our inefficient securities regulatory 
framework with 13 provincial regulators as well as concerns about inef-
fective enforcement. 
1. Fundamental Principles of Capital Markets Regulation
The purposes of capital markets regulation are often stated as: 12
• promoting fair and efficient capital markets;
• protecting investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices;
and
12
 See, e.g., Ontario’s Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 1.1. 
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• maintaining public/investor confidence in the capital markets. 
In an efficient capital market, the price of stocks reflects all relevant 
information that is available about their intrinsic or true value.13 A stock 
represents a claim on future cash flows, and thus the intrinsic value is the 
present value of the cash flows the owner of the security expects to re-
ceive. If stock prices accurately reflect all information, new investment 
by capital goes to its highest-valued and best use.  
Investor confidence in the capital markets impacts liquidity and cost 
of capital for businesses. Liquidity relates to the volume of outstanding 
shares that are freely trading and refers to the concept of buying or sell-
ing shares in the capital markets without causing a significant movement 
in the price.14 Having many buyers and sellers trading shares in the capi-
tal markets assists in achieving liquidity. 
The cost of capital is the price that businesses must pay to access in-
vestors’ money.15 If investors lose confidence in the market, they are less 
likely to invest in the market, resulting in reduced liquidity. If investors 
continue to invest in the market, they are likely to demand high returns 
for their investments, resulting in a higher cost of capital for businesses 
that want to access public capital. If businesses cannot raise money from 
outside investors, they will not be able to invest in profitable projects. 
This decreases growth, employment and wealth-creation.16 
Capital markets regulation in Canada governs the capital-raising 
process for businesses. It also regulates intermediaries in the capital mar-
kets, such as underwriters who assist issuers in accessing the market and 
                                                                                                             
13
 Richard Brealey & Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (New York: Irwin 
McGraw Hill, 2006), at 351-77. For detailed discussions of efficient markets theory, see Eugene 
Fama, “The Behavior of Stock Market Prices” (1965) 38:1 Journal of Business 34; Eugene Fama, 
“Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work” (1970) 25:2 Journal of Fi-
nance 383; Eugene Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets II” (1991) 46:5 Journal of Finance 1575; 
Burton Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street, 9th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2007). 
14
 Utpal Bhattacharya, “Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and Liquidity of the 
Market” in Canada Steps Up: Final Report, vol. 6 (Toronto: Task Force to Modernize Securities 
Legislation in Canada, 2006) 131, at 144. 
15
 Id., at 138. 
16
 Id., at 137. Bhattacharya states: 
If securities laws are not enforced, outside investors will doubt whether they will get their 
money back with a fair return. So outside investors will not give their money to firms 
(this leads to low liquidity in capital markets) or, if they give money to firms, they will 
demand a higher return (this leads to a higher cost of equity). If firms cannot raise money 
from outside investors, they will not be able to invest in profitable projects. This de-
creases growth, employment, and wealth-creation. 
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brokers, advisors and mutual fund salespeople who assist investors in 
investing their savings in the capital markets. 
Capital markets regulation requires disclosure of information by is-
suers so as to enhance the efficiency of the market by allowing stock 
prices to reflect publicly available information. It also mandates disclo-
sure of information so that investors can make informed investment 
decisions, resulting in higher investor confidence. Capital markets regu-
lation also provides for public and private enforcement remedies if there 
is non-compliance with the disclosure regime to ensure a high level of 
investor protection. 
Capital markets regulation requires market intermediaries such as 
brokers and salespeople to be licensed and registered in order to protect 
the investing public by ensuring that the investors do not entrust their 
money to unscrupulous or incompetent financial services providers, 
again to ensure a high level of investor confidence. 
Currently, the 13 provincial/territorial securities commissions regu-
late the capital markets to promote efficiency, investor protection and 
investor confidence. If the 13 provincial/territorial securities commis-
sions are regulated well, investors will likely keep their money in or 
bring their money to Canada and not take it elsewhere. In addition to the 
13 provincial/territorial securities commissions, the self-regulatory or-
ganizations (“SROs”) such as the Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada (“IIROC”) and the Mutual Fund Dealers’ Asso-
ciation (“MFDA”) also play a role in regulating some aspects of the 
Canadian capital markets.17 
2. Positive Correlation between Strong Capital Markets Regulation 
and Capital Markets Development 
Many academic studies indicate that the quality and strength of capi-
tal markets regulation in a country has a positive relationship with the 
capital markets development in that country. The quality of a country’s 
                                                                                                             
17
 See IIROC website for further details of its mandate, online: IIROC <http://www.iiroc.ca/ 
english/about/pages/default.aspx>.  IIROC was created in 2008 through the consolidation of the 
Investment Dealers Association of Canada (“IDA”) and Market Regulation Services Inc. (“RS”). It 
is the national SRO that oversees all investment dealers and trading activity on debt and equity mar-
ketplaces in Canada. It carries out its regulatory responsibilities through setting and enforcing rules 
regarding the proficiency, business and financial conduct of dealer firms and their registered em-
ployees, and through setting and enforcing market integrity rules regarding trading activity on 
Canadian equity marketplaces. See MFDA website for details of its mandate, online: MFDA 
<http://www.mfda.ca/about/aboutMFDA.html>. 
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regulation (including disclosure requirements, governance requirements 
and actual enforcement) can also have a positive effect on efficient pric-
ing, liquidity and cost of capital for businesses.18 
Some studies have found that stricter and better enforced securities 
regulation is positively associated with development of the capital mar-
ket, including the size of a country’s equity capital market and level of 
initial public offerings.19 While this study focused on the value of private 
enforcement, other studies conclude that public enforcement is at least as 
important as private enforcement in the development of stock markets.20 
Other studies have analyzed international differences in firms’ cost of 
equity capital across 40 countries and found that firms from countries 
with more extensive mandated disclosure requirements, stronger securi-
ties regulation and stricter enforcement mechanisms have a significantly 
lower cost of capital.21 Similarly, another study found that improvements 
in the capital market governance index (including degree of earnings 
opacity, enforcement of insider trading laws and removal of short selling 
restrictions) are associated with decreases in the cost of equity, increases 
in market liquidity and increases in market-pricing efficiency.22 
Recent scholarship has also found that there is a relationship between 
countries’ institutional features and outcomes such as accounting quality, 
corporate transparency and firms’ cost of capital. For example, a study by 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki shows that a country’s legal environment (in-
cluding the strength of its investor protection laws and the enforcement 
of those laws) directly impacts firms’ incentives to comply with financial 
                                                                                                             
18
 Christopher Nicholls, “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and Illustrative 
Case of Canada’s Legislative Response to Sarbanes-Oxley” [hereinafter “Nicholls”] in Canada Steps 
Up: Final Report, vol. 6 (Toronto: Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, 2006) 
127; Bernard Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets” 
(2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
“What Works in Securities Law?” (2006) 61:1 Journal of Finance 1. 
19
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, id. 
20
 Howell Jackson & Mark Roe, “Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Re-
source-Based Evidence” (2009) 93:2 Journal of Financial Economics 207. 
21
 Hail & Leuz, supra, note 11. See also Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-
Jorgesen, “Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments” (2005) 
121:2 Quarterly Journal of Economics 399; Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, “Investor Protec-
tion and Equity Markets” (2002) 66:1 Journal of Financial Economics 3; Allan Ferrell, “If We 
Understand the Mechanisms, Why Don’t We Understand the Output?” (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 503. 
22
 Hazem Daouk, Charles Lee & David Ng, “Capital Market Governance: How Do Security 
Laws Affect Market Performance?” (2006) 12:12 Journal of Corporate Finance 560.  
610 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
reporting rules and provide high quality financial reports to outside in-
vestors.23  
Similarly, Ball, Kothari and Robin examine the influence of financial 
reporting standards as well as other economic factors on the reporting 
decisions of firms in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.24 
The authors find that even in those countries that have high quality ac-
counting standards that may parallel those of the U.S. and International 
Accounting Standards, other institutional and enforcement factors limit 
the effectiveness of the accounting standards, which ultimately leads to 
lower quality financial reporting by firms in these countries.25 
Some recent studies show that foreign investors invest more in coun-
tries with better disclosure regulations. Leuz, Lins and Warnock found 
that firms with governance problems attract significantly less foreign 
investment and the association between governance and investment by 
foreign U.S. investors is most pronounced in countries with overall gov-
ernance weaknesses and weak disclosure requirements.26 
3. The Canadian Discount 
Studies show that Canadian public companies pay investors more for 
using their capital than companies in the U.S. and that Canadian compa-
nies are valued lower than their U.S. counterparts. Leuz and Hail found 
that the cost of equity capital is 25 basis points higher in Canada than in 
the United States.27 Another study by King and Segal concluded that  
Canadian public companies are valued significantly lower than those in 
the United States while attempting to control for a number of variables.28 
                                                                                                             
23
 Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda & Peter Wysocki, “Earnings Management and Investor 
Protection: An International Comparison” (2003) 69:3 Journal of Financial Economics 505. 
24
 Ray Ball, S.P. Kothari & Ashok Robin, “The Effect of International Institutional Factors 
on Properties of Accounting Earnings” (2000) 29:1 Journal of Accounting and Economics 1. 
25
 See also Raphael La Porta, et al., “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance” (2002) 
57:3 Journal of Finance 1147; Stijn Claessens, et al., “The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets: 
Evidence From Asia’s Financial Crisis” (2001) CEI Working Paper Series 2001-15; In-Mu Haw et 
al., “Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions” (2004) 42:2 
Journal of Accounting Research 423; Ray Ball & Lakshmanan Shivakumar, “Earnings Quality in 
UK Private Firms: Comparative Loss Recognition Timeliness” (2005) 39:1 Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 83; David Burgstahler & Michael Eames, “Management of Earnings and Analysts’ 
Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises” (2006) 33:5-6 Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting 633. 
26
 Christian Leuz, Karl Linz & Francis Warnock, “Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly 
Governed Firms?” (2009) 22:8 Review of Financial Studies 3245. 
27
 Hail & Leuz, supra, note 11. 
28
 King & Segal, supra, note 11.  
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As such, Canadian public companies must be content with this “Cana-
dian discount” which puts them at a disadvantage internationally vis-à-
vis other firms seeking capital and investors. The lower valuations of 
Canadian companies and the higher cost of capital that our companies 
must pay can, in part, be attributed to our inefficient securities regulatory 
framework with 13 provincial regulators as well as perceptions and con-
cerns about ineffective enforcement.29 
III. THE CHANGING FACE OF INVESTORS AND ISSUERS  
This part of the paper discusses some changes that have taken place in 
both Canadian and international capital markets with respect to investors 
and issuers. The data show that both Canadian investors and Canadian 
businesses rely more heavily on capital markets for their savings and fi-
nancing needs, respectively. As well, in light of the globalization of capital 
markets, both investors and issuers have more choice about where they 
invest and where they seek capital, respectively. As such, Canada needs to 
mobilize its regulatory structure to respond to globalization if it wants to 
remain competitive in retaining and attracting investors and issuers.  
1. Increasing Importance of Capital Markets to Investors 
The capital markets matter to investors, whether they are Canadian 
or foreign, retail or institutional. The data show that the Canadian capital 
markets have become increasingly important to Canadians for savings. In 
the early 1960s an estimated 44 per cent of annual personal savings were 
put into life insurance as a wealth-building vehicle; by the 1990s this had 
dropped to 22 per cent, in favour of other alternatives, such as mutual 
funds and pension funds.30 As of 2003, almost one-half of all Canadians 
owned publicly traded equities, either directly or indirectly through mu-
tual funds, double the amount in 1990.31  
                                                                                                             
29
 Paul Halpern & Poonam Puri, “Reflections on the Recommendations of the Task Force to 
Modernize Securities Regulation in Canada: A Retail Investor Perspective” (2008) 46:2 Can. Bus. 
L.J. 199. See also Gordon Boissonneault, “The Relationship between Financial Markets and Eco-
nomic Growth: Implications for Canada” [hereinafter “Boissonneault”] in A. Douglas Harris, ed., 
It’s Time: Research Studies (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003). 
30
 Tarek Harchaoui, Two Decades of Financial Intermediation by the Canadian Insurance 
Business (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, April 1997), at 2, online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan. 
gc.c/pub/63f0002x/63f0002x1997011-eng.pdf>. 
31
 WPC, supra, note 2, at 6, citing TSX Group, Canadian Shareowners Study (2003). 
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If pension fund holdings are included, then almost all Canadians par-
ticipate in the equity markets.32 For example, the Canada Pension Plan 
(“CPP”) holds 55 per cent of its portfolio in public equities.33 More gen-
erally, the data show that stocks traded in the public capital markets 
account for about 40 per cent of Canadian pension funds asset portfo-
lio.34 This percentage has been stable between 1993 and 2006.  
However, foreign holdings by pension funds have more than doubled 
to 30 per cent, while holdings of Canadian securities have correspond-
ingly fallen.35 Moreover, in recent years, Canadian capital markets seem 
to have experienced difficulty attracting foreign investors, as growing 
foreign holdings of Canadian stocks have not kept pace with Canadian 
holdings of foreign stock.36 Considering Canada’s strong economic per-
formance, some commentators hypothesize that this disparity may be due 
to inefficiencies in the regulation of Canadian capital markets, which 
ends up taxing capital market transactions in Canada.37 
2. Increasing Importance of Capital Markets to Canadian  
Businesses 
The data also show that Canada’s capital markets have been playing 
an increasingly important role in funding the growth of Canadian busi-
nesses. Chart 1 shows that from the early 1960s through the mid-1990s 
Canadian corporations sourced funding predominantly through loans and 
borrowing, while the next decade saw a dramatic increase in the relative 
importance of share issuances. The public equity markets accounted for 
over one-half of corporate fundraising in 2000-2005.38 A similar upward 
trend can be observed in respect of long-term financing: in 1990, the 
capital markets provided 73 per cent of long-term financing of Canadian 
firms; by 2002, this had grown to 88 per cent.39 
                                                                                                             
32
 WPC, id., at 6. 
33
 CPP Investment Board 2010 Annual Report at 17, online: CPP Investment Board 
<http://www.cppib.ca/files/PDF/CPPIB_AR_2010_EN_Online.pdf >. 
34
 Poonam Puri & Palladam Vasudev, “Canadian Pension Funds: Investments and Role in 
the Capital Markets and Corporate Governance” (2010) 25:2 B.F.L.R. 247, at 251. 
35
 Id., at 259. 
36
 Boissonneault, supra, note 29, at 58. 
37
 Id., citing Charles Freedman & Walter Engert, “Financial Developments in Canada: Past 
Trends and Future Challenges” (Summer 2003) Bank of Canada Review 3. 
38
 Allan Tomas, Recent Trends in Corporate Finance: Some Evidence form the Canadian 
System of National Accounts (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2006), at 9 [hereinafter “Tomas”], online: 
Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13-604-m/13-604-m2006050-eng.pdf>. 
39
 WPC, supra, note 2, at 4, citing Bank of Canada. 
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)  THE CAPITAL MARKETS PERSPECTIVE 613 
It is also important to note that most businesses that access public 
capital in Canada do not do so locally, but rather nationally. Approxi-
mately two-thirds of all reporting issuers in Canada are reporting issuers 
in more than one province/territory.40 Approximately 30 per cent of the 
issuers listed on the TSX and the TSX Venture Exchange are “national 
issuers” reporting in all 10 provincial jurisdictions.41 
Although a full two-thirds of Canadian issuers report in more than 
one province, the Canadian capital market does segment by region based 
on different concentrations of industry and expertise. Oil and natural gas 
companies, for example, tend to be headquartered in Alberta, financial 
services in Toronto and mining small cap in British Columbia.42 
However, the location of a company’s headquarters often bears little 
relationship to the economic impact of the company’s activities. Finan-
cial services, for example, are frequently headquartered in Ontario, but 
they account for between 12 per cent and 23 per cent of the GDP of other 
provinces.43 Similarly, oil and gas companies may be headquartered in 
Alberta but their exploration activities extend from Newfoundland and 
Labrador to Iqaluit. In a very real sense, then, such companies are na-
tional and indeed international in scope and should be subject to 
consistent national regulation rather than a checkerboard of provincial 
and territorial rules. To the extent that regulatory expertise has developed 
in the provinces and territories where, for instance, oil and gas or finan-
cial services are regulated, that regulatory expertise should be harnessed 











                                                                                                             
40




 Poonam Puri, “Local and Regional Interests in the Debate on Optimal Securities Regula-
tory Structure” (2004) for the WPC, at 214. 
43
 Id., at 215. 
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Chart 1: Share Issuance Overtakes Borrowing in Importance44 
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3. Greater Global Competition and Cross-Listings on the Rise  
Canadian businesses are increasingly accessing foreign capital mar-
kets, as evidenced by the data on cross-listings of Canadian firms abroad. 
The significant use of U.S. capital markets in particular by Canadian 
firms suggests that access to global sources of capital is also important 
for Canadian firms. 
Canadian capital markets are small by global standards. With a mar-
ket capitalization of US$1,033,448.50 in December 2008, the TSX 
Group accounted for 3.2 per cent of global market capitalization, and 
ranked eighth among the world’s 10 largest equity exchanges.45 
                                                                                                             
44
 Tomas, supra, note 38. 
45
 World Federation of Exchanges, 2008 Domestic Market Capitalization, World Federation 
of Exchanges, online: <http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2008/equity-markets/ 
domestic-market-capitalization-0> [hereinafter “WFE”]. The 10 largest, in descending order are: 
NYSE Euronext, Tokyo SE Group, NYSE Euronext (Europe), NASDAQ OMX, London SE, Shang-
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The small size of Canadian capital markets implies that when Cana-
dian issuers find the Canadian capital market insufficient to meet their 
capital needs, they cross-list on foreign exchanges in an effort to attract 
more investors.46 Cross-listing in another jurisdiction has generally bene-
fitted Canadian firms by lowering their cost of capital and increasing 
their valuation while simultaneously increasing their share turnover and 
their visibility.47 
As of March 2006, 48 Canadian companies were listed on the Lon-
don Stock Exchange.48 As of March 2010, 178 Canadian companies 
(approximately 12 per cent) were cross-listed in New York.49 Other Ca-
nadian issuers are cross-listed elsewhere in Europe or Australia. 
Canadian issuers are particularly well represented on London’s Al-
ternative Investment Market (“AIM”), where approximately 20 per cent 
of foreign issuers on AIM are Canadian issuers.50 AIM has been quite 
active in attracting foreign listings, growing from three in 1995 to 157 in 
June 2005.51 Two-thirds of AIM’s foreign issuers listed between January 
2004 and June 2005.52 
New York is the most popular market in which Canadian firms cross-
list. Of the 178 Canadian firms cross-listed in New York in March 2010, 
38 were listed on NASDAQ, 75 on NYSE, and 65 on NYSE Alternext.53 
In December 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission re-
ported that 40 per cent of the foreign firms registered and reporting with 
them were Canadian, over four times as many firms as the next-most rep-
resented jurisdiction.54 
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While the data show that Canadian firms look to foreign markets, 
Canada is not high on the list for cross listing by foreign issuers. As Pro-
fessor Nicholls also points out: 
Canada’s equity markets are neither a leading choice for cross-listing 
by foreign issuers (as, for example, the London Stock Exchange is); nor 
are they large enough to ensure that they will remain the primary 
markets for the largest Canadian companies (as, for example, the New 
York Stock Exchange is for most large U.S. issuers).55 
The data suggest that Canada can do better in attracting foreign issu-
ers and maintaining the listings of domestic issuers. The financial crisis 
of September 2008 underscored in a dramatic way the interconnected-
ness of global capital markets. This interconnectedness allows businesses 
to raise capital where it is most easily available and least expensive.  
Additionally, technology allows investors to search globally for the best 
returns, either directly or through intermediaries such as pension funds.56 
This global competition for capital will continue to intensify. This is the 
environment in which Canadian issuers are competing for capital, from 
both domestic and international investors. To remain competitive, Can-
ada needs to address the inefficiencies associated with its regulatory 
structure. Canada has to attract capital markets activity to remain com-
petitive in both retaining and attracting investors and issuers.57 
IV. DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL  
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT  
As noted in earlier parts of this paper, regulation and regulatory 
structure have an impact on the quality of a jurisdiction’s capital market 
and can impact the decisions of both investors and issuers on where to 
invest and seek capital, respectively. Canada’s fragmented regulatory 
structure, resulting in the Canadian discount, makes Canada less com-
petitive on the global front.  
Although Canadian capital markets are increasingly being affected 
by international regulations and developments, and by competition from 
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other jurisdictions, Canada’s already limited influence globally in capital 
markets is declining partially due to constraints inherent in the Canadian 
regulatory system.58 This part of the paper describes six trends in the 
global and regulatory environment that further exacerbate the negative 
impact of Canada’s fragmented regulatory structure.  
1. Greater Regulatory Cooperation between Countries and IOSCO 
Gains Prominence 
As trade and financial markets have globalized, countries have been 
increasingly interested in regulatory cooperation. The International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) was founded in 1983 
to act as a cooperative regulatory body at a global level to mitigate sys-
temic risk, enhance investor protection and strengthen information 
exchange and cooperation in enforcement against misconduct.59 The G20 
has encouraged IOSCO to continue its work on cross-border enforcement 
cooperation.  
Currently, because of our regulatory structure, Canada is the only 
country that does not have a national voice at the IOSCO. Instead, On-
tario and Quebec sit as “ordinary members” and Alberta and British 
Columbia as “associate members”.60 This produces a spectacle of dispro-
portion with Canada holding four seats yet only representing about 3 per 
cent of global market capitalization, while the United States, which has 
about 35 per cent of the global market capitalization, holds two seats, one 
ordinary and one associate.61 Ironically, none of the four Canadian 
“seats” has any authority to speak for Canada.  
Canada is lacking a strong, consistent and authoritative voice at  
IOSCO, as well as in negotiating cooperative initiatives such as with the 
SEC and other leading capital markets jurisdictions.62 
What other leading regulators think about the Canadian securities 
regulatory system is important. For example, in 2008, the SEC started 
negotiating a free trade in securities agreement with Australia but did not 
do so with Canada, on the basis that our securities structure was too 
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fragmented.63 If Canada is out of step with other leading jurisdictions, we 
could be at a competitive disadvantage for reciprocal agreements such as 
the MJDS and free trade agreements.  
2. Regulatory Consolidation, Both Provincially and Internationally 
Another important trend in the regulatory environment is regulatory 
consolidation in the financial services sphere. This is taking place both 
globally and also within Canada. This trend reflects the blurring of the 
key elements of the financial sector — banks, trusts, insurance compa-
nies and securities dealers64 — and is also a recognition of the 
interconnectedness of the financial system.65 Some commentators have 
suggested that the asset backed commercial paper crisis in Canada could 
have been better handled had we had greater consolidation in the finan-
cial regulation area.66 
The Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) in the U.K. is a key exam-
ple of a consolidated financial services regulator. The FSA has held 
regulatory authority over all financial services providers in the U.K. 
since December 2001. In November 2004, the FSA was given regulatory 
power over mortgages, followed by power over general insurance activi-
ties in January 2005.67  
Similarly, some of the Canadian provinces have also consolidated 
provincial financial market regulation.68 On February 1, 2004, Quebec 
launched its regulatory integration with the launch of the Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (“AMF”), which oversees the regulation of the fi-
nancial sector, including insurance, securities, deposit-taking institutions 
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and the distribution of financial products and services.69 Saskatchewan is 
also in the process of regulatory consolidation in the financial services 
sector through Enterprise Saskatchewan.70 
While other jurisdictions both globally and within Canada are ac-
tively considering regulation consolidation, Canada is lagging behind, 
lacking consolidation even on the securities regulation front.  
3. Expectations of Timely Regulatory Action  
Technological advances have increased the speed and reach of capi-
tal markets activity. As such, another trend in the regulatory environment 
is a focus on timely delivery of new legal rules and reform to existing 
rules. 
However, under the current system in Canada, it can take months or 
even years to put in place a national or multilateral instrument through 
the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) because whatever is 
agreed to, if anything, must then be approved separately, by each indi-
vidual province or territory. It generally takes at least 18 months to put a 
national or multilateral rule in place, since 13 provinces/territories need 
to come to agreement on the policy and the specific measures being 
taken.71  
Moreover, the current fragmented system makes it more difficult for 
Canada to respond quickly to fast-moving developments. Two examples 
illustrate well the delay experienced under the current system with the 
CSA. The first example is the implementation of Canada’s response to 
the U.S.’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act.72 SOX came into force as of July 2002, 
while the Canadian measures came into effect almost two years later in 
March 2004. The CSA gave priority to designing suitable measures for 
the Canadian capital market but the result was a collection of five in-
struments and policies, only some of which were national and binding 
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across the country as some jurisdictions refused to participate in the new 
rules.73 Canada’s slow response to SOX and the much-publicized U.S. 
accounting failures illustrates both the need for timely and coordinated 
national responses to significant international events, and the difficulty 
Canada currently has in implementing one. 
The second example involves the delay in implementing the short 
selling ban in Canada that resulted from the seemingly impending col-
lapse of a number of U.S. banking institutions in 2008. While the FSA in 
the U.K. and the SEC in the U.S. were able to immediately coordinate a 
ban on short selling during the market meltdown on September 18, 
2008,74 Canada could only belatedly follow 24 hours later, an eternity in 
trading terms, because of the coordination that had to take place between 
the Ontario Securities Commission (the lead regulator for the TSX) and 
the other provincial/territorial regulators.75  
Canada was heavily criticized for this 24-hour delay in responding as 
trading was quite volatile, particularly for financial institutions’ stock. For 
example, on September 18, Citigroup closed 18.7 per cent up over the pre-
vious day, American Express closed 14.2 per cent up, the Dow Jones 
industrials average closed 3.9 per cent up, and S&P TSX composite closed 
1.6 per cent up.76 The 24-hour delay could potentially have had significant 
and negative consequences for a cross-listed financial institution.  
4. Greater Consolidation of SROs and Quasi-Regulatory Bodies 
The capital markets are comprised of many players including inves-
tors, issuers, intermediaries, stock exchanges and SROs. Other than the 
securities commissions, which remain provincial, yet which have awk-
wardly tried to harmonize using the CSA, most of the other players of the 
Canadian capital markets are national in scope.  
                                                                                                             
73
 Nicholls, supra, note 18, at 178. 
74
 SEC Release No. 34-58592, Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, online: 
SEC <http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58592.pdf>.  
75
 CSA indicated support on September 19, 2008 for the Ontario Securities Commission’s 
Temporary Order prohibiting short selling of securities of certain financial sector issuers listed on 
the TSX. OSC, Temporary Order Section 127(1), (2) and (5), online OSC <http://www.osc.gov. 
on.ca/en/15959.htm>. 
76
 David Berman, “The Close: Hope Springs” The Globe and Mail, September 18, 2008, 
online: Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/markets/markets-blog/the-
close-hope-springs/article710370/>.  
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)  THE CAPITAL MARKETS PERSPECTIVE 621 
For example, the two main SROs in Canada, the IIROC and the 
MFDA, are national in scope.77 Similarly, there has been significant con-
solidation and harmonization of the stock exchanges in Canada. Prior to 
1999, Canada had five stock exchanges: the Vancouver Stock Exchange 
(“VSX”), the Alberta Stock Exchange (“ASE”), the Winnipeg Stock Ex-
change (“WSE”), the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSE”, subsequently 
“TSX”), and the Montreal Exchange (“ME”). Perhaps one of the most 
obvious indicators of the national scope of capital markets is the 1999-
2000 consolidation of the five regional stock exchanges into four na-
tional exchanges that are segmented by product type.78 The four national 
exchanges currently are the TSX for senior equities, the TSX-V for jun-
ior equities, the Bourse de Montréal for derivatives trading and the 
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange for commodity futures and options.79  
5. Greater Accountability for Costs  
As public institutions, regulators are accountable for the ways in 
which they spend public funds. There are at least three areas of incre-
mental cost associated with the current regulatory structure in Canada: 
(1) cost of duplication in the regulatory structure; (2) increased compli-
ance costs for issuers and intermediaries; and (3) opportunity costs for 
issuers, intermediaries and investors resulting from missed opportuni-
ties.80 One study estimated that consolidating 13 regulators into a single 
national regulator with one head office and five regional offices would 
save 37 per cent of the total regulatory operating budget.81 Much of these 
savings could be spent on substantive regulatory matters such as rule-
making, compliance and enforcement under a single national regulator. 
6. Greater Expectations about Enforcement  
Studies show that even the best-designed regulation must be en-
forced effectively if it is to optimally promote investor protection and 
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investor confidence.82 Studies also show that investors and capital mar-
kets participants have high expectations about regulatory enforcement.83 
There have been many critiques of Canada’s lax public enforcement 
stance, particularly in comparison to the U.S.’s more stringent, back-
ended approach to enforcement. 
Some of the criticisms around enforcement include (1) the complex-
ity and inefficient allocation of resources that the duplicative and 
fragmented structure of the current enforcement system creates; (2) a 
lack of enforcement action on high-profile cases; (3) delays between de-
tection of misconduct and regulatory action; (4) delays in adjudication; 
(5) lack of accountability at enforcement institutions; (6) lack of exper-
tise and resources at the regulatory and criminal investigative level; and 
(7) ineffective enforcement investigations at IMET.84 
Some of these concerns would be addressed through the single na-
tional regulator, which proposes to (1) consolidate and harmonize both 
regulatory and criminal enforcement in the same body; (2) provide 
criminal investigators with additional investigative tools; (3) create an 
independent hearing panel; and (4) establish simplified, consistent na-
tional standards for complaint handling and redress.85  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to provide an empirical foundation from a 
capital markets perspective evidencing the current need for a national 
securities regulator in Canada. The intent of the foregoing empirical as-
sessment has been to provide an empirical footing from which to ground 
the constitutional discussion and debate.  
By first exploring the relationship between Canada’s regulatory 
structure and the strength, or lack thereof, of its capital markets, it is 
clear that Canadian firms are suffering from a “Canadian discount” that 
can be attributed, in part, to Canada’s inefficient securities regulatory 
framework. The data also show that Canadian retail and institutional in-
vestors increasingly rely on the public capital markets to make 
investments. Similarly, Canadian businesses are increasingly relying on 
                                                                                                             
82
 See, for example, Poonam Puri, A Model for Common Enforcement in Canada: The Ca-
nadian Capital Markets Enforcement Agency and the Canadian Securities Hearing Tribunal 






 Supra, note 6. 
(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)  THE CAPITAL MARKETS PERSPECTIVE 623 
public capital markets for their financing needs. The data also suggest 
that global competition for capital compels a more proactive Canadian 
response to remain competitive in attracting and retaining both issuers 
and investors alike. Finally, the paper outlined six trends in the global 
and regulatory environment that exacerbate the negative impacts of Can-
ada’s fragmented regulatory structure, further underscoring the need for a 
national regulator. 
The lack of a Canadian securities regulator not only does a disservice 
to investors and businesses, it puts Canada out of step with the rest of the 
world, where the trend is towards consolidation of regulation. Indeed, as 
has been pointed out, Canada remains the only major industrialized na-
tion not to have a national securities regulator. In determining the 
constitutionality of federal capital market regulation in Canada, it will 
therefore be crucial to examine the underlying data, including the 
changes in the global and Canadian capital markets, indicating the neces-
sity of a national securities regulator at this time.  
 
